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COLLATERAL ORDER - KNEE-DEEP IN CONFUSION:
ITS CONTINUING SAGA - SELL V. UNITED STATES,
123 S. CT. 2174 (2003)
Under the final judgment rule, a federal defendant normally must
wait until a final judgment, such as a judgment of guilt, to obtain appellate
jurisdiction.'

Congress, however, enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("§ 1291",),2

and the United States Supreme Court interpreted the statute to create the
collateral order doctrine as an exception to the final judgment rule. Thus,
under the doctrine, a defendant may appeal a decision that "does not necessarily mean the last order possible to be made in a case."4 In Sell v. United
States,5 the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant can appeal a
pre-trial order that requires him to receive medications so that he can stand
fit for the trial.6 Over Justice Scalia's strong dissent, the Court ruled that
the pre-trial order qualified as an exception under § 1291, permitting the
defendant to appeal.7
In Sell, the issue over the application of the collateral order doctrine
arose when Charles Sell, a defendant and former practicing dentist, refused
to take antipsychotic medication for his mental illness while facing trial for
fraud and attempted murder. 8 A federal magistrate judge ("Magistrate")
initially found Sell, who had a long history of mental illness, competent to
stand trial but later revoked bail because Sell's condition worsened. 9 Sell
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (explaining final judgment
rule that federal appellate jurisdiction defends on existence of final judgment). The Court
defined a final judgment as a "decision .. . that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Id.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides, in pertinent parts: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ... except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying texts
(stating reasons for creating collateral order doctrine).
3 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949) (explaining Supreme Court's genesis of collateral order doctrine).
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (defining meaning
of "final order" under § 1291).
' 123 S.Ct. 2174 (2003).
6 See id. at 2181.
7 See id. at 2183 (indicating holding of case).
8 See id. at 2179 (describing events triggering defendant's attempt for application of
collateral order doctrine). Sell stood trial for numerous charges including mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, money laundering, and attempt to murder a FBI agent and a former employee.
See id.
9 See Sell, 123 S.Ct. at 2179.
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subsequently asked the Magistrate to reconsider his competence to stand
trial. 0
After holding a hearing, the Magistrate had Sell examined at a
United Stated Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, found him mentally
incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him hospitalized to determine
whether he could recover the capacity to stand trial." While in the hospital, Sell refused to take antipsychotic medication as prescribed by the staff
and ultimately challenged the prescribed medication in court.' 2 Upholding
the recommended medication,
the Magistrate authorized forced administra13
tion of antipsychotic drugs.
Sell appealed and the District Court issued a pre-trial order staying
the Magistrate's ruling of forced medication.' 4 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, assuming jurisdiction over Sell's appeal without discussing the5
issue of the collateral order doctrine for the district court's pre-trial order.'
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the appellate decision and remanded
the case.'6 The Court first held that the Eighth Circuit properly exercised
jurisdiction on hearing Sell's appeal7 and reversed the order for forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,18 the Supreme Court
first articulated the collateral order doctrine of federal appellate jurisdiction.19 Interpreting § 1291, the Cohen Court developed a three-prong test
to determine whether a litigant may appeal a final order as a "collateral
order" when it (1) "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," (2)
"resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action," and (3) is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.",20 Since Cohen, the Court has attempted to apply the doctrine "with
the utmost strictness" and confined it to very narrow circumstances. 2 Fur-

"'

See id.

' See
2 See
13 See
14 See

id.
id.
id. at 2181.
generally Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2181 (commenting lack of consideration for collat-

eral order doctrine on parts of District Court and Court of Appeals).
15 See Sell. 123 S.Ct. at 2181 (describing Eighth Circuit's ruling); see also id. at 2187
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (admonishing Eighth Circuit for failing even to consider whether
Sell's appeal constituted collateral order).
16 See id. at 2178-79.
See id. at 2181, 2187 (reporting decisions of case).
1' 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
19See id. at 546 (identifying genesis of collateral order doctrine).
20 See id. (specifying elements of collateral order).
21 See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1984) (stressing
17

stringent condition for qualification of collateral order). In Midland, the Supreme Court
had emphasized that it found denials of only three types of motions to be collateral orders

that are immediately appealable in forty years since its inception: motions to reduce bail;
see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), motions to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, see
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thermore, the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress enacted § 1291
to implement a policy that favored deferring appeals until after conclusion
22
of the trial over continuing costly and potentially unnecessary litigation.
While the final judgment rule promotes efficiency and prevents
"piecemeal adjudication," the Court has created the exception to the final

judgment rule to remedy trial court errors that must remain uncorrected
until after the litigation.- If uncorrected, the errors would victimize the
party who has tO bear the unnecessary cost of litigation before having the
opportunity to appeal. 24 Furthermore, erroneous decisions prior to the entry of final judgment might, as a practical matter, inflict harm that is irrepa-

rable or incurable after final judgment.25
In deciding whether a pre-trial order is collateral, the Court attempted to "eschew a case-by-case approach.- 26 Some decisions, however,
suggest the opposite.27 Crafting a number of inventive permutations to the
Cohen three-prong test, these decisions tried to balance competing interests, inconsistently applying the doctrine and utilizing an ad hoc case-bycase approach.28 In Local No. 438, Construction & General Laborers'

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and motions to dismiss under the Speech or
Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). See id.
22 See e.g. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (maintaining "there has
been a firm congressional policy against interlocutory or 'piecemeal' appeals and courts
have consistently given effect to that policy.").
23 See Richard-Merrill, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (declaring final
judgment rule avoids delay and excessive cost when appeal interrupts proceeding); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (stating final judgment rule prevents "the
debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of
what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy"); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (emphasizing final judgment rule is supported by considerations such as avoiding economic waste and delayed justice).
24 See Jordan L. Kruse, Appealability of Class Certfflcation Orders: The "Mandamus
Appeal" and a Proposal To Amend Rule 23, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 704, 711-12 (1997) (stating
final judgment rule, despite its supporting rationale, can result in severe hardship).
5 See Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89-92 (1975) (arguing for more practical approach to finality because strict adherence often preclude review).
26 See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999) (explaining
Court's creed of strict application of collateral order).
27 See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (describing examples
of Court's
departure from strict adherence to Cohen).
28 See e.g. Gillespie v. United States Steel, 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (adopting balancing
test in collateral order issue that weighed convenience and costs of piecemeal review
against "danger of denying justice"); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170 (construing issue in cost of
notifying every class member in class action as separate from merits). See infra notes 25-30
and accompanying texts. See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine:
A New "Serbonian Bog" and Four Proposalsfor Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 551-76
(contending enormous amount of inconsistency in Supreme Court's approach to doctrine
from 1960s to 1980s).

156

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

Union v. Curry,29 the Supreme Court permitted an appeal because denying
it would have undermined national labor policy. 30 Although the appeal
would have been moot after the conclusion of the case, as required by
Cohen's third prong, the Court allowed the appeal because
it favored the
3
national labor policy over a strict adherence to Cohen. 1
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,32 the Court's treatment of the second prong the "separate from the merits" requirement - proved most controversial. 33
In Mitchell, the Court held that a denial of a government official's defense
of qualified immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.34
To determine whether an official is entitled to immunity from civil
charges, the district court must examine whether the plaintiff established
his right at the time of the official's actions and whether a reasonable person would have realized that he was violating that right.35 This inquiry is
inherently related to the merits of the action, requiring an analysis of the
particular circumstances to determine the applicability of the right and
whether it was clearly established.36 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
second prong was satisfied because the issue of immunity is "conceptually
distinct" from the merits of the action.
In short, the Court's application of the collateral order doctrine has
a checkered history, replete with inconsistency and confusion. 38 One Justice complained that "our finality jurisprudence is solely in need of a limiting principle.- 39 The judges of the federal circuit echoed the criticism,
charging that inconsistent application of the collateral order doctrine has
29 371 U.S. 542(1963).

" See id. at 550 (pointing out Supreme Court's reliance on other factors instead of
Cohen test).
31See id. (demonstrating Court's balancing act).
32

472 U.S. 511 (1985).

33 See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutor, Appeals in the Federal Court,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1188 (pointing out "[t]he Mitchell opinion has been persuasively criticized"); see also Anderson, supra note 28, at 570 (commenting "[tihe Mitchell

Court eviscerated the separability requirement..
34 See Mitchell. 471 U.S. at 530.

35See id. at 528; Solimine, supra note 33, at 1187-88. Professor Solimine asserted
that "[q]ualified immunity should be granted as long as the defendant's actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Id.
36See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1187-88.
37See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-28. The Court has yet to define adequately what
"conceptually distinct" from the merits means. See generally id. See also Anderson, supra
note 28, at 568 (opining Mitchell decision reached "its highwater mark" in "expansion of
the collateral order doctrine").
38See Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutorv Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 184 (2001) (commenting that "[collateral
order] doctrine has had a troubled history").
39See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988)
(Scalia. J.concurring).
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caused a "litigation explosion," 4° fostered "regrettable expense and delay,"4 1 and led judges into a "maze" of confused and contradictory doctrinal minutiae.4
In Sell, the Court determined that the District Court's order of forced
medication of the petitioner fell within the collateral order exception.
Applying the three-prong test, the majority held that the district court's
order "conclusively determine[d]" Sell's legal right to avoid forced medication, "resolve[d] '.. issue[s] of clear constitutional importance" for involuntary medical treatment that is distinct from Sell's culpability, and was "ef44
fectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment" on the charges.
Furthermore, the majority stressed that the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction
over Sell's appeal was particularly appropriate because the issues "involve[d] the severity 45of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the
constitutional issue.,
Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that both the Supreme Court and
the Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over Sell's appeal. 4 ' Justice Scalia
rejected the majority's determination that a post-trial appeal of Sell's medication would "come too late.",47 Rather, like "any substantive-due-process
challenge," he argued, Sell's appeal "must wait until after conviction and
sentence have been imposed," even if an ordinary
appeal would come too
48
late for the "type of remedy [Sell] would prefer.
Therefore, as Sell's claim was based on a "substantive-due-process
challenge," Justice Scalia argued, Sell must wait until the end of the trial
because precedent rejected such a rationale for granting jurisdiction. 49
Justice Scalia further warned that hearing Sell's appeal would "effect a
breathtaking expansion of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders. 50 He also predicted that the majority's ruling would introduce a
dangerous precedent because it would empower a defendant to delay the

40 See In re United States, 733 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1984).

41 See Manhattan Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. Manhattan Beach, 881 F.2d 816,
817 (9th Cir. 1989).
42 See Board of Educ. v. Illinois States Bd. Of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir.
1996).
41 See Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2177.
44 See id.
45 See id.

46 See id. at 2188 (disagreeing with majority on issue of appellate jurisdiction).
41 See id. at 2189.
48

See Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2189.

49 See id. (giving examples of such precedence in Flanagan v. United States, 465

U.S. 259 (1984); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982); and
Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957)).

"o See id. at 2190.

158

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

trial. 5' Justice Scalia was wary of defendants frivolously challenging pretrial orders, such as orders objecting to certain courtroom attire.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Sell did not dispel
the confusion over the application of the collateral order doctrine.53 The
confusion still persists because the Court relied on Cohen, but abandoned
strict adherence to its three-prong test for the collateral order exception.
Instead, the Court used a form of heightened constitutional scrutiny weighing "the severity of governmental intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue" - and applied it to distinguish the petitioner's appeal from Justice Scalia's examples. 55 Writing for the majority,
Justice Breyer appeared to concede that Justice Scalia's examples may
satisfy Cohen's three-prong test. 56 Justice Breyer, however, distinguished
forced medication of antipsychotic medication from Justice Scalia's examples because the former "involve[d] the severity of the intrusion and corre57
sponding importance of the constitutional issue" and the latter did not.
Like Curry and Mitchell, the logic of the Sell decision evoked a balancing approach to appealability under the collateral order doctrine.58
Without the "severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the
constitutional issue" requirement, more liberty interests may qualify as a
collateral order. 59 As such, if the Court were to permit the run-of-the-mill
liberty interests as grounds for appeal under § 1291, the demands for ap-

.' See id.
See id. Here, Justice Scalia cited three examples of frivolous challenges that the

52

may quality as collateral orders under the majority's ruling: 1)an order requiring a defendant to wear an electronic bracelet that may immediately infringe one's "constitutional right
to 'bodily integrity"'; 2) an order forbidding a defendant to wear a T-shirt that says "Black
Power" that may violate his First Amendment rights; and 3) an order compelling testimony
that may violate Fifth Amendment rights. See id. The majority, however, distinguished
Sell's appeal from Justice Scalia's examples. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (assessing effect of majority's
ruling).
54 See infra note 55 and accompanying text (pointing out Court considered one more
factor of "the severity of governmental intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue" in addition to Cohen three-prong test).
55 See supra notes 45, 52 and accompanying text (explaining how Court distinguished
Sell's appeal against forced medication order from Justice Scalia's examples).
56 See Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2182 (inferring from language of Justice Breyer's opinion);
see supra note 52 and accompanying text. In the opinion, Justice Breyer wrote, "These
considerations [in undergoing forced medication], particularly those involving the severity
of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue, readily distinguish
Sell's case from the examples by the dissent." Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2182 (emphasis added).
'7 See supra notes 45, 55-56 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (suggesting adding new factor of heightened constitutional scrutiny as ad hoc approach).
59 See notes 21, 45, 55-56 and accompanying text (indicating Cohen three-prong text
may not sufficiently limit application of doctrine with utmost restriction).
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peals would waste judicial economy and cause delay. 60 As in the precedent
cases,
this Court tweaked the Cohen three-prong test to balance appealabil1
ity.

6

In Sell the Court added the heightened constitutional scrutiny to
fend off the frivolous claims for appeals that would otherwise meet the
Cohen three-prong test.6 2 This balancing act, however, cannot escape criticism. 63 Adding this new heightened constitutional scrutiny - "the severity
of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue" compounded the impression that the Court's standard in collateral
order
64
cases is still an ad-hoc, individualized, case-by-case determination.
The confusion, however, does not end there. 65 The Court distinguished forced medication from Justice Scalia's examples but failed to
define a clear contour of what liberty interests "involve the severity of the
intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue." 66 Justice Breyer's analysis suggested that unwanted antipsychotic medication
violates one's liberty interest because it "operate[s] on the individual's
thought process, and this implicate[s] ... issues of personhood and individuality., 67 Unlike nonmedicinal orders such as challenges to courtroom
attire, forced administration of anti-psychotic medication alters the chemical balance in a patient's brain and dictates one's identity, behavior, and
relationship to his or her surroundings.68 Such profound intrusion over
60

See supra note 45 and 52 and accompanying text (forecasting litigation explosion

without "severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue"
requirement).
61 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (comparing Sell to Curry
and
Mitchell).
62 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining reason behind
balancing
approach in Sell).
63 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (pointing out problems with balancing approach).
6 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (arguing Sell decision did not dispel
confusion).
65 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (commenting decision in Sell
adds to
current confusion in application of collateral order doctrine).
66 See supra notes 43, 50 and accompanying text (asserting need for Court's further
characterization of its standard).
67 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association, Sell, 123 S.Ct.
2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available in Lexis, 2002 U.S. Briefs 5664, *8 (comparing antiphyshotic drugs with other medicines such as vaccinations or sedatives).
68 See Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and Standards of Review
Under Pressure form Biological Technologies, II HEALTH MATRIX 351, 440 (2001)
(stating "[Miental integrity may implicate a particularly strong interest: the mind, after all,
is a - probably the - constitutive component of personal identity, more so than our physical
constitutions"); see also David M. Siegal et al, Old Law Meets New Medicine: Revisiting
Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 307,
313 (asserting "[p]sychotropic drugs are powerful chemicals; the removal of neurotic or
psychotic symptoms can be accomplished by a lessening of normal anxiety, and can permit
a 'don't care' mental status rather than responses based on self-protection").
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one's cognitive process and personhood violates one's liberty interest from
the "right to be let alone ...giving government the power to control men's
minds. 69
Therefore, it appears that Sell's case is on one end of the spectrum
of the severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue, and perhaps Justice Scalia's examples are at the opposite
end. 70 The problem, however, rests in the middle of this spectrum because
the Court did not precisely establish a standard for what constitutes a severe governmental intrusion that violates one's liberty interest. 71 This lack
of a clear contour on the part of Supreme Court may open the judiciary's
gate to other substantive claims.72
In distinguishing Sell's appeal of liberty interest as a collateral order, the Court created a new heightened constitutional scrutiny - "the severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional
issue." This decision departed from strict adherence to the Cohen standard
and demonstrated an ad hoc approach to the application of the collateral
order doctrine. Furthermore, the Court's lack of a precise contour fueled
confusion about the prevailing standards applicable to the collateral order
doctrine.
H. Joon Chung

69 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (quoting from Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting)); id.at 238 n.3 (quoting

from Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
70 See notes 43, 52 and accompanying text (comparing Sell's appeals to that of Justice
Scalia's examples in the degree of "the severity of the intrusion and corresponding impor-

tance of the constitutional issue").

See notes 63-68 and accompanying text (forecasting confusion due to lack of definitive contour of what issues involve "the severity of the intrusion and corresponding
importance of the constitutional issue").
71

72

See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.

